ABSTRACT Mobile personal devices, such as smartphones, USB thumb drives, and sensors, are becoming essential elements of our modern lives. Their large-scale pervasive deployment within the population has already attracted many malware authors, cybercriminals, and even governments. Since the first demonstration of mobile malware by Marcos Velasco, millions of these have been developed with very sophisticated capabilities. They infiltrate highly secure networks using air-gap jumping capability (e.g., ''Hammer Drill'' and ''Brutal Kangaroo'') and spread through heterogeneous computing and communication platforms. Some of these cross-platform malware attacks are capable of infiltrating isolated control systems which might be running a variety of operating systems, such as Windows, Mac OS X, Solaris, and Linux. This paper investigates cross-platform/heterogeneous mobile malware that uses removable media, such as USB connection, to spread between incompatible computing platforms and operating systems. Deep analysis and modeling of cross-platform mobile malware are conducted at the micro (infection) and macro (spread) levels. The micro-level analysis aims to understand the cross-platform malware states and transitions between these states during node-to-node infection. The micro-level analysis helps derive the parameters essential for macro-level analysis, which are also crucial for the elaboration of suitable detection and prevention solutions. The macro-level analysis aims to identify the most important factors affecting cross-platform mobile malware spread within a digitized population. Through simulation, we show that identifying these factors helps to mitigate any outbreaks.
I. INTRODUCTION
Computer viruses have been around since 1972 [1] . The term computer virus originated from biological viruses. A viral infection such as influenza virus can spread from one person to another through airways (communication channels) and activate other previously inactive viruses in a human body. An influenza virus can be developed, mutated and spread during a season change, and it causes a new viral infection from an infected source. The viral infection transmission rate depends on few factors such as population and number of the susceptible individuals for infection (i.e., individuals who are not immune to the new or mutated virus).
The well-established association between biological viruses and their mathematical models have encouraged investigators to borrow the mathematical methods to study computer virus proliferation. Computer virus investigators used general patterns of information distribution, they modified standard epidemiological methods by laying it on a directed graph and used both analysis and simulation to investigate computer virus behaviour. Thus, they determined the conditions under which epidemics are likely to occur.
Creating robust models for explaining viruses spreads through population are useful for several purposes. First, it enables analysts to understand the menace posed by a newly developed virus and spread methods. For example, the use of conceptual models of virus spread enabled the analysts to anticipate the behaviour of future viruses, and later to prove that their anticipations were substantially valid [2] . 1 Malware developed by scientists or malware samples gathered from various sources are stored in a repository for analysis. 2 These types of malware are written and released to the wild (public) with the intension of infecting and causing damage to computerized systems.
shown to be ineffective in detecting and mitigating such threats. For example, it has been shown that the most current version of mobile antivirus software can detect as low as 20 percent of the smartphone malware 3 [6] . Malware authors use aggressive methods such as dynamic code loading, Java-reflection, encryption, and obfuscation to avoid detection. Some malware can even detect and remove antivirus applications.
CONTRIBUTION
The goal of this work is to investigate CP-Mal and quantify its impact using formal models and their simulations, respectively. Our models and analysis focus at both micro (infection) and macro (spread) levels. At the micro-level, our focus is to understand the CP-Mal states and transitions between these states during a node-to-node infection, which is crucial for the elaboration of detection and prevention solutions. At the macro-level, our focus is to identify the important parameters of CP-Mal infection spread within a population. Identifying these parameters helps to mitigate any outbreaks.
Hence, the contribution of this study is twofold: first, investigating early CP-Mal samples that spread from a host computer (e.g., PC or laptop) to a smartphone and from a smartphone to a host computer using USB connections, developing state machine models of their infection mechanisms using Coloured Petri Nets (CPN); and second, using the developed models to investigate the existing smartphone malware spread models, and proposing an enhanced epidemic model to capture the spread of CP-Mal. The models developed in this study will benefit the research community by encouraging them to develop more effective prevention, detection, and mitigation mechanisms, and to evaluate these mechanisms through simulations.
The remainder of this study is structured as follows. Section II, a short survey on smartphone malware spread. In Section III, CP-Mal infection is described. Section IV, formal CP-Mal specifications are described. Section V describes existing epidemic models and proposes a novel deterministic epidemic model for CP-Mal. Finally, in Section VI, methods for controlling and preventing a major CP-Mal outbreak is discussed as part of the conclusion.
II. A SHORT SURVEY ON SMARTPHONE MALWARE SPREAD
A computer virus is a segment of a piece of code that copies itself into one or more ''host(s)'' (e.g., PC, smart devices, storage, Internet of Things, gadgets, etc.) or attaches itself to other programs. Whenever the infected programs run, the viral code gets triggered and executed, thus spreading the virus further. In 1986, Cohen [7] , [8] was the first researcher who gave a well-defined definition for computer viruses. Cohen defined two similar information areas as cells and assumed that they are able to communicate a sequence of symbols. If a cell (α) contains a virus (κ) and contacts a cell (β), it results in the transmission of κ; κ sequences of symbols stored in β may be changed. If appropriate communication channels are attainable, a virus can propagate from one cell to another.
A virus attack on computer systems begins with an initial infection. The virus attack timeline is illustrated in Figure 1 . The virus infection may be formed internally, or it may start from an external malicious server possibly by importing infected data or applications. Once installed, each time a virus is executed, various data may become infected. Every distribution of a virus is named an infection, and the duration over which an infection takes place is referred as the spread time. A common virus spreads from one application to another application, and from one user account to the another user account, eventually embedding its replication in every program in the system.
The infectious period ends when a virus moves to the transitive closure of information flow within the system. In most operating systems, the infection can spread to all installed applications within the so called takeover time. With special users that have all the privileges, the system is taken over while this user's applications become infected.
At this point, an adversary hoping to do severe damage might choose to wait quietly. This way an adversary can cause backup-drives to dump infected copies of applications. A particularly harmful virus might even infect the backup end server and try to encrypt all information on the backup-drives, decrypting data upon retrieval until such time as desired. The duration of which an attacking virus delays before delivering damage is named the delay time.
The damage starts when the triggering conditions are met within the triggering time. Once triggering happens, each time an infected application is executed, it causes damage.
Although many viruses' spread techniques have been widely recognized by antivirus (AV) research communities, today virus writers use poly-/meta-morphism techniques meaning that viruses can change their behaviours and characteristics instantaneously. The use of a wide variety of mutation techniques in the existing viruses can impede detections and infection prevention techniques.
Consequently, advanced and costly techniques, such as emulation, negative heuristic analysis, generic decryption scanning, and access to virtualization, are needed for detection. Additionally, mobile devices, such as the smartphone, tablets, and Internet of Things, with multiple communications capabilities provide an opportunity to spread viruses rapidly as in the case of emerging cross-platform malware (CP-Mal).
A. SMARTPHONE MALWARE SPREAD
After the surge of mobile malware (MM), Cabir appeared in 2004 [9] . To date, several innovative creations of MM for a wide variety of mobile operating systems have been discovered. Several channels have been used to spread MM to a device or a PC locally and globally. Cabir.A, a worm, was an earlier variant of the Cabir malware family that uses wireless Bluetooth channel (IEEE 802.15 standard) for spreading locally. CommWarrior.A uses Bluetooth and AT commands 4 for spreading through Multimedia Messaging Service (MMS). The MMS message contains an infected file. The file attempts to access the contact list on the device and sends infected MMS to other victim's devices following the contact list entries.
1) VECTORS FOR SPREADING SMARTPHONE MALWARE
Just like the smartphone technology, smartphone malware advances with short innovation cycles. Since the origin of the smartphone, wireless standards such as IEEE 802.11 and IEEE 802.15 have become a conventional method of communication between individuals around the globe [10] . Accordingly, they become favourite choice for infecting other devices and spreading through a digital community. But this does not mean that other communication channels are secure. All wireless communication standards can be potential infection channels for smartphone devices.
2) SMARTPHONE MALWARE SPREAD THROUGH BLUETOOTH
Bluetooth (i.e., IEEE 802.15.1) is one of the several extremely recognised wireless standards around the globe. This shortrange radio wave standard has been widely violated by malware developers to both contaminate digital devices (e.g., smartphone and tablets) and diffuse a malicious payload between potential victims [11] . Malware developers can activate Bluetooth connection quietly on the mobile devices. This lets the malware to be transmitted to other Bluetooth-enabled smartphones directly and aggressively. In some cases, smartphone owner's approval may be required for the malware to invade the device and cause devastation. In others, malware is able to install malicious packages without user consent after being distributed via Bluetooth [11] . Bluetooth malware spread has been covered extensively in [12] .
3) SMARTPHONE PAYLOAD
The payloads are usually the destruction inflicting part of the smartphone malware. Any payload falls into two categories: (A) nuisance and (B) devious. The nuisance malware payloads are typically not dangerous; they do not violate security and breach privacy. Whereas, the devious payloads are developed with many harmful intentions in mind. These type of payloads are planned to abuse the information stored in a victim device for a financial advantage, new payload propagation, identity theft, or perform other malicious actions. Some examples of devious payloads include unauthorized information access, stealing of credit card numbers and breach of user privacy.
4) SMARTPHONE MALWARE SPREAD THROUGH SMS
The Short Message Service (SMS) is a communication standard for transmission of short text messages to and from mobile devices. What most users do not notice in an SMS text is the portion which commands the device to execute several steps. A plaintext message is followed by a list of instructions which are decoded and performed by the device. These instructions tell smartphone how to process the message precisely. It is in this domain which the SMS service becomes a source of malware infection. To date, there is no influential smartphone malware developed that abuses SMS service to infect the devices. Nevertheless, susceptibility has been detected, and SMS is considered to be a dangerous infection vector.
5) SMARTPHONE MALWARE SPREAD THROUGH MMS
Multimedia Messaging Service (MMS) is a communication technology developed by the Third Generation Partnership Project. MMS enables users to send pictures, video clip, emoji stickers, audio and formatted text in addition to plaintext messages. With high-quality microphones and cameras embedded in smart devices, sending multimedia through MMS has been adopted to be adjunct feature to a text message. MMS service becomes a source of malware infection because it permits sending an infected multimedia message to smart devices.
6) SMARTPHONE MALWARE SPREAD THROUGH PHYSICAL CONNECTIONS
It appears that today's smart devices have been abandoning the wire connection gradually. However, USB type C is a bi-directional power which is heavily used in smart devices and portable devices. This newly innovative data transmission cannot be removed in the near future because most smart devices perform system backups, updates, charges, audio and synchronizations through these types of connections. It is known that a significant number of smartphone malware samples has employed both synchronisation and memory flashcards as an infection and spread method.
7) SIMULATORS ADOPTED FOR MODELLING SPREAD SMARTPHONES MALWARE
Several simulators have been proposed to model smartphone malware infection and spread. An event-based simulator was developed by [13] . This simulator evaluates the effects of mobile malware propagation, specifically malwares spreading through Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) and MMS. Similarly, the end-to-end framework (i.e., EpiNet) simulates the malware spread over wireless channels [14] . Furthermore, the EpiCure [15] improves scalability and provides more realistic scenarios to analyse complex attacks.
NS2 (Network Simulation -2) is a discrete event simulator used in networking studies, e.g., simulation of IP protocolsover wired and wireless networks. Yan and Eidenbenz [16] employed the open-source NS-2 simulator to investigate smartphone malware by looking into effects of various variables on malware propagating. However, this investigation fails to scale such as analysing epidemic in a wireless network.
The trace-driven simulations (i.e., model's data are derived from a sequence of observations made on a real system) are used to investigate the Bluetooth malware spread. It has been shown that such a malware is able to infect a widerange of population within a few days [17] . A fine-grained agent-based simulation can emulate hybrids mobile malware propogation (i.e., MMS/SMS and Bluetooth) within a mobile ad hoc network in public areas such as a concert, train station, and an airport terminal [18] .
B. BACKGROUND ON EPIDEMIC MODELS
Analytical epidemic modelling has a substantial record in the research of biological infection diseases. Kermack and McKendrick wrote several journal articles titled ''Contributions to the Mathematical Theory of Epidemics'' [19] . In that respect, the journal articles are usually recognized as the foundation of feasibility study for further advancements that engages analytical (mainly focus on a deterministic system) modelling research to investigate the propagation of infectious diseases. The majority of the traditional epidemic models [20] - [22] include:
• SIR (Susceptible Infectious Recovery).
• SIS(Susceptible Infectious Susceptible).
• SI (Susceptible Infectious). Each epidemic models consist of three distinct states:
• Susceptibility (S): The susceptible individual is one that has not been infected, but there is a possibility of infection.
• Infection (I ): The infected individual is one that has capability of spreading a virus.
• Recovery (R): The recovered individual is one that was infected by a virus and is immunized to the that type of virus. Generally, epidemic models [23] - [26] are organized into three classes:
• Stochastic.
• Spatialtemporal.
1) DETERMINISTIC EPIDEMIC THEORY AND MODELS
In this study, deterministic epidemic theory is investigated. The most basic deterministic epidemic theories are formed as SI epidemic model (Figure 2a) , the SIS epidemic model ( Figure. recovered state (R). In deterministic models randomly mixing populations are considered, implying the contacts between the individuals can happen at the same rate.
Some of the terminologies related to these epidemic theories are described as follows:
• µ indicates fertility rate, this parameter relates to the newly born individuals to the population at a time.
• λ means mortality rate, this parameter indicates ratio number of deaths due to infection in a period of a time.
• N represents entire number of individuals that exist in susceptibility, infection and recovery states.
• S(t) represents the number of individuals which have not been infected by a virus at time t.
• I (t) indicates entire number of individuals which have been infected by the virus and each infected individual can spread the virus to those in the susceptible state.
• R(t) describes the infected individuals that gain immunization after the infection states.
• β denotes the average number of adequate contacts between individuals that caused increasing infection among the population at a time. This parameter is called contact rate.
• α this parameter denotes the average recovery rate from infection state.
• δ denotes the mean loss of immunity rate of recovered individuals or the average rate of recovered individuals who change state to susceptible once again.
• αI denotes the number of new individual recoveries from infection at a time t.
• βSI this parameters denotes the number of new infections at a time t.
• δR denotes the number of new susceptible for infection at a time t.
2) SUSCEPTIBLE INFECTED EPIDEMIC (SI)
In the SI deterministic model, it is assumed that a susceptible individual, after successful contact with an infected individual becomes infected; however, a newly infected individual cannot gain immunization to the infection. The differential equations explaining an SI deterministic epidemic theory depend on the other premises which are shown as follows:
3) SUSCEPTIBLE INFECTED SUSCEPTIBLE EPIDEMIC (SIS)
In the SIS deterministic model, it is assumed that a susceptible individual, after successful engage with an infected individual, change the state and becomes infected; however, a newly infected individual cannot build an immunization to the infection. Therefore, after recovery, infected individuals turn into the susceptible state. The differential equations explaining an SIS deterministic theory depend on the other premises which are shown as below:
4) SUSCEPTIBLE INFECTED RECOVERY EPIDEMIC (SIR)
In the SIR deterministic model, susceptible individuals become infected from previously infected individuals, then individuals develop immunity and move into an immune (i.e.,recovery) state R. The SIR deterministic model has been involved with several viral infections such as measles, mumps and chickenpox. The differential equations explaining an SIR epidemic theory are defined as below:
5) SUSCEPTIBLE INFECTED RECOVERY SUSCEPTIBLE EPIDEMIC (SIRS)
In the SIRS deterministic model, the model is that Is (i.e., infected individuals) are capable of developing an immunization and recovering from an infection, but they will become susceptible again from recovery state R. The differential equations defining an SIRS epidemic theory are expressed as below:
6) STOCHASTIC EPIDEMIC THEORY AND MODELS
Stochastic models are based on random variables for estimating the probability of infection over the time. Stochastic models are classified based on their associated structures: global, network or social group. It is suitable for the study of investigating the probability of an outbreak in small communities [27] - [30] . The stochastic models are divided into three categories:
The stochastic epidemic models vary within fundamental theories concerning time unit and state of random variables. For example in the SDE, the model depends upon a diffusion process, in which time and state variables are considered to be persistence, whereas, in the CTMC model, time is considered to be persistence, but state variables are separate. Finally, in the DTMC model, the time unit and state variables are considered to be discrete. The stochastic epidemic models are explained based on the basic SIR and SIS epidemic models.
7) SPATIAL-TEMPORAL EPIDEMIC MODEL
Spatial-Temporal Epidemic Models [24] are based on cellular automata (CA), which consist of graphs where each node is a finite state automaton. The cells within these graphs (i.e., two-dimensional lattice) are results of the global functions on all the cells. This model is capable of simulating complex systems with discrete time and space variables.
The concept of cellular automata (CA) was introduced by Kari et al. [31] and White et al. [32] . Authors have tried to explain easy and functional structures of the CA, where it can be applied to the model in different application areas. Within this regards, two famous works are proposed by John Conway and Stephen Wolfram. John Conway introduced a well-known game of life theory, which obtained extensive consideration between the researchers. However, Stephen Wolfram considered the combination of simple one-dimensional CA rules and created simplest of rules that can emulate the complex behaviour.
A CA is a discrete dynamical model, in which time, state and the space of the system are different. Usually, a CA can be determined as One-dimensional, two-dimensional, and threedimensional CA. These are applied in various studies.
The most remarkable cellular automata models of the neighbourhood are the Von Neumann neighbourhood (Figure 3a ) and the Moore neighbourhood (Figure 3b ).
8) SMARTPHONE MALWARE EPIDEMIC MODELS
So far a number of studies have investigated spread vectors for mobile malware. In [33] and [34] , the 802.15 malware infection has been studied under activation and spread phases. This study detailed a mathematical model that characterizes the propagation dynamics of the malware.
Rhodes and Nekovee [35] proposed the dynamic infection of a mobile malware spread through the population of wireless-enabled devices in ad-hoc networks. This study investigated a model with a low-density mobile population where there is no connection to any initially infected devices. This study employed a standard mass-action mixing model for malware spreading and the contact rate was derived from the kinetic model. It highlighted the contact rate between population and mobile devices in both short range and longerrange transmitters (IEEE 802.11/15).
A research study was conducted to investigate how cellular phones running the Symbian and Windows OSs become infected through communication channels (IEEE 802.11/15) [36] . This study used the Susceptible-InfectedSusceptible (SIS) epidemic model. The model investigated the contact rate of MM in Washington metropolitan area.
Studies on mobile malware illustrate the various target discovery, infection and and replication mechanisms, which mobile malware authors deployed to spread to the other mobile devices. The previous study investigated the behaviour of Cabirs's malicious code that spreads through point-to-point wireless channels [37] . The studies presented so far provide evidence that standard techniques for modelling computer malware spread cannot be applied in mobile malware because they ignore the node velocity, positions, and the non-homogeneous connectivity channels which arise in ad hoc or mobile networks. In this research, the authors introduced a new framework called probabilistic queuing, which treats node mobility as a first-order concern. The framework includes concepts of node mobility and connectivity skew. It presents an exact threshold condition which specifies the menace of malicious code to the probability that it causes an outbreak network infection.
A two-layer network model for illustrating malware spread through both IEEE 802.15 and SMS was proposed by Gao and Liu [38] , [39] . The proposed model illustrates the influence of human behaviour, such as operational behaviour and mobile behaviour, as critical for propagating a malware through IEEE 802.15 and SMS channels. The autonomy-oriented computing (AOC) is applied to evaluate the effect of patch distribution delay in restraining mobile malware propagation. The experimental results show that an AOC-based dissemination strategy can transmit security notifications or patches to mobile devices fast and with a low communication cost. This fast and low-cost communication helps to recover or avoid the potential damages of the mobile malware in mobile networks.
A Susceptible-Infected (SI ) epidemic model (see 1) based on differential equations was proposed by Cheng et al. [40] . This study investigated the speed and severity of propagating the heterogeneous malware such as Commwarrior. This type of mobile malware attempts to infect mobile devices through multimedia messaging service (MMS) and 802.15 channels. This study performed experimental investigations among 2000 individuals. Based on the results obtained from their experiments, the authors concluded the limited inconsistency exists mainly due to the hybrid mobile malware that may propagate to individuals who have already been infected. These uncertain boundary conditions could not be considered in the epidemic analysis.
Susceptible-Exposed-Infected-Recovered (SEIR) model explains how mobile malware uses several communication channels for spread [41] . In this research, the authors investigated the influence of the communication capabilities and behavioural patterns, such as node mobility and heterogeneity, on the mobile malware propagation. Mobile malware, such as Skulls, Mosquito, Cabir, Lasco, and Commwarrior, have been analysed. These types of malware use IEEE 802.11/15 and SMS/MMS communication channels for their propagation. Experimental investigations were performed to evaluate and explore the influence of various parameters on the dynamics of malware propagation. The results indicated that the contact rate parameter is playing a vital role in the spread of mobile malware.
A Susceptible Exposed Infected Recovered Dormancy (SEIRD) theoretical framework was proposed by Xia et al. [12] in order to perform stability analysis in hybrid mobile malware. This study highlighted the rate at which a susceptible mobile device became exposed (latent) and that the number of the contact rate has a great influence for hybrid malware spread.
Since the majority of mobile malware have so far exploited Bluetooth and SMS/MMS channels, Fan et al. [42] proposed the Susceptible-Exposed-Infected-Recovered(SEIR) deterministic mathematical model for hybrid malware. This study identified that the preventive immunity and the mutation of mobile malware have an important impact on mobile malware spread.
An efficient IEEE 802.15 malware spread modelling scheme using a two-dimensional cellular automaton based on the epidemic theory was proposed by Peng et al. [43] . This model considered two factors, namely infection and resistance factors. The infection factor is used to evaluate the degree of the spread of infected nodes. The resistance factor was used to offer a resistance evaluation towards susceptible nodes.
To demonstrate the differences between IEEE 802.15 and MMS mobile malware, Wang et al. proposed a SusceptibleInfected (SI ) (see 1) deterministic model. The authors investigated what critical factors contributed to the spread of dynamic infection in the mobile network. They found hybrid malware are three times faster than an MMS malware, and spreading infection depends on human interactions.
A device-to-device mobile malware infection vector contributed in [44] . This research is employed simulator called Mobile Security & Privacy Simulator [45] to demonstrate malware spread through device-to-device in downtown Chicago metropolitan area within a couple of hours using a wireless channel.
To date, few studies have been conducted to address the spread behaviour of malware across mobile devices. These empirical, theoretical and simulation studies mostly focused on attacks through the Internet, using short-range radio transmissions (e.g., Bluetooth networks and Wi-Fi-based wireless ad hoc networks) and long-range transmission attacks (e.g., SMS, MMS) for malware propagation. Peng et al., Liu et al., Thompson and Morris-King, focused on malware spread in homogeneous devices. It has been confirmed that mobile malware can also spread from Host → Mobile, Mobile → Host, and Market → Mobile devices.
III. CROSS-PLATFORM MALWARE INFECTION
Malware can be transferred to a smartphone through its network or USB interfaces. For example, the most common ways to infect an Android device are repackaging, drive-by download and update. Repackaging piggybacks malicious payloads onto popular Android apps. Malware authors: (1) download popular apps, (2) disassemble them by using reverse engineering techniques, (3) embed malicious payloads, and (4) reassemble them to upload the newly infected apps to Android Markets. Through drive-by downloads, users are tricked into downloading apps. In the updating method, the malware uses the update mechanism to fetch a malicious payload during runtime, which makes the malware difficult to detect.
The following methodology is used to analyse 50 CP-Mal samples. Eight CP-Mal (Table 2) are identified using USB activation method for smartphone-to-host and host-to-smartphone infections. Android CP-Mal samples are reverse engineered using the APK Tool. The resulting malware code is manually inspected for behaviour analysis. Angroguard is used to convert APK files into GEXF (Graph Exchange XML Format) which is visualized using Gephi.
A. MALWARE SPREAD THROUGH SMARTPHONE USB CONNECTION
USB offers a singular interface to connect various types of electronic gadgets. The first class of USB infection methods uses Windows Autorun (.inf ) [46] , which includes several Windows shell commands to run an application after a USB storage device is inserted into the host computer. File shortcuts (aliases), which can be linked to an executable malicious program file, constitute the second class of methods. Stuxnet and flame are two malware instances that have used .lnk files. Manipulating USB storage devices' firmware constitutes the third class of methods. Nohl et al. [47] (BadUSB) have managed to intercept the firmware update process, reverse engineered the USB firmware and injected code into the original firmware to change its functionality. This highlights supply chain security risk issues where retailers have managed to pre-install malware on new smartphones.
B. MALWARE ACTIVATION METHODS
Malware authors use app market to initially distribute their trojanized app to target populations. This trojanized app behaves like a legitimate app until the injected malicious code is activated through a user activity such as plugging a smartphone into a host for charging, booting the device, sending or receiving an SMS, initiating or receiving a call and network activity. An activated malware may take several actions to download and install a new payload or app, send and receive commands from remote servers, or spread itself. In Table 2 , we illustrate several malware samples that are initially distributed via app market and activated through a USB connection.
C. MALWARE VISUALISATION
In this section, we visually analyse the malware files and cluster the dependent critical malicious codes including activities, services, receivers and permission risks. Each color cluster set represents a newly observed pernicious code that can incur irretrievable critical damage to the hardware and software. Visualising malware can clearly present static and dynamic malware behaviours. Visualisation minimize the overall time of investigations and provides a high-level overview of the VOLUME 5, 2017 runtime behaviour of a malware. We used the information extracted from the visual analysis to develop models of the CP-Mal. Figure 4 illustrates USBClaver malicious code visualisation.
D. SMARTPHONE-TO-HOST INFECTION
USBCleaver is an Android trojan that initially arrives as a package (com.novaspirit.usbcleaver). When the infected mobile device is connected to an autorun-enabled host via USB, USBCleaver accesses the host to gather information such as network configuration (e.g., DNS, Default Gateway, MAC), user passwords stored in browsers, and Wi-Fi passwords. We decompiled the USBCleaver APK file to investigate its malicious behaviour. The trojanized file consists of Android Manifest and several classes for mainMenu, downloader, payloads and USBCleaver activities. The Manifest requests permissions for writing to external storage and accessing the Internet and network state. USBCleaver mounts the mobile device as Z volume with an autorun.inf component. Upon activation, it invokes the downloader method to download packages from www.novaspirit.com. USBCleaver invokes several payloads (e.g., Chrome, IE, FF, Wi-Fi, and system information) that extract critical user information.
E. HOST-TO-SMARTPHONE INFECTION
Fakebank/Gepew is designed to compromise a mobile device connected to an infected host computer via a USB connection. The infection starts with a Trojan called Droidpak. It drops malicious load-time and run-time Dll files, creates regsvr32.exe and registers it as a system service on the infected host. It then downloads configuration files and necessary tools such as Android Debug Bridge to infect a USB-connected Android smartphone. To complete the installation, USB Debugging must be enabled on the Android smartphone. The Gepew malware searches for any apps associated with South Korean banks. If an app is found, the malware prompts the user to delete the app and to install a trojanized version (Fakebank B). The Trojan monitors and intercepts incoming SMS messages and forwards collected information to the remote server at www.slmoney. co.kr address.
F. USB INFECTION MODELS
The malware spread is determined by several sequential events in state-space. Modelling malware in state-space provides a detailed abstract view of malware families, which can be used to understand possible ways victims get infected and infections get spread. Today, only a limited number of smartphone malware are capable of cross-platform infection, but they have the potential to evolve both in quality and quantity due to an increasing demand for new payload delivery mechanisms that can reach deep inside isolated networks.
This study uses Coloured Petri Nets (CPN) [48] to capture the abstract behaviour of CP-Mal, which can be formally analysed to understand how CP-Mal may evolve. CPN consists of sets of places P, transitions T and arcs (P → T or T → P). Places with the → T arcs are called the input places, and places with the T → P arcs are called the output places. A CPN may contain a discrete number of tokens with associated data values called colours. Any distribution of tokens (i.e., states of the malware) is called a marking. A home marking is a marking which is reachable from all other markings. Metrics such as dead transition and markings gives valuable information regarding weaknesses of the abstracted process.
CPN tool provides an editing, simulation, and analysis environment for modelling and validation of concurrent and distributed processes such as the CP-Mal infection and spread. Modelling using CPN tool has several advantages, including correctness analysis of the model, integration of the process, capturing the model's data structure and stepby-step state execution. Hence, this study first develops hostto-smartphone and smartphone-to-host malware infection models using the existing malware samples. Next, these two models are combined to understand the possibility of an epidemic behaviour. Finally, the existing epidemic models are enhanced to capture and illustrate the scale and conditions for CP-Mal spread of recent threats such as ransomware, banking trojan, botnet, and adware.
IV. FORMAL CROSS-PLATFORM MALWARE SPECIFICATION
A smartphone malware program M contains malicious payload M (p), which may consist of any subset of malicious packages p = {p 1 , p 2 , p 3 . . . , p n }. The | p | depends on functions supported by the malware. M (p) includes an ordered list of packages, which also represents the order in which packages can be executed to perform a function such as infecting a smartphone from a host using a USB connection. For example, assume that p 1 = ''USB Cleaver APK '', p 2 = ''.link/.inf package'', p 3 = ''DLL''. Then, USB Cleaver malware can be defined as M (p) = p 1 ||p 2 ||p 3 . As the required packages are downloaded, USB Cleaver malware will evolve (repackage) and be enumerated (for CPN tool use) as follows: 
A. HOST-TO-SMARTPHONE INFECTION MODEL
In this section, we develop a host-to-smartphone infection CPN model as illustrated in Figure 5 (upper part). The malware starts infecting a host by dropping a dll file (e.g., Gepew instance M (m) = m a with multiset m a = {''Droidpack''}) to a victim host in the first phase (PH1). It follows by downloading several infection packages (e.g., Gepew instance M (m) = m a ||m b and M (m) = m a ||m b ||m c ) from a remote server or specific app market for the second and third phases (PH2 and PH3). The first package from PH2 is required to enable USB debug mode (e.g., Gepew multiset m b = {''USB Debug Mode''}). The second package from PH3 is the infected app (e.g., Gepew multiset m c = {''Fakebank B APK ''}). The infected app is installed on the smartphone via the established USB debug mode and starts sending and receiving commands to the C&C server in the fourth phase (PH4).
A transition (i.e., actions performed by the malware) may occur if there are sufficient tokens in all of its input places. When completed, it consumes the input tokens and creates output tokens in its output places. Infection phases (PH 1 − 4) consist of finite sets of place P and transition T as listed in Table 3 .
As illustrated in Figure 5 (upper part), when the malware becomes fully functional in PH4 with complete payloads (e.g., Gepew instance M (m) = m a ||m b ||m c ), it communicates continuously with the C&C server by iterating between Command and C&C Server (also referred to as live transition instances). In the CPN model of Figure 5 (upper part), Payload and Send_i are home markings, which are reachable from all other markings.
B. SMARTPHONE-TO-HOST INFECTION MODEL
A smartphone-to-host infection ( Figure 5 -lower part) is still one of the best options for malware authors to bypass perimeter protection and spread the malware anonymously. The infection starts with an infected smartphone (e.g., USB Cleaver instance M (p) = p 1 ||p 2 with packages p 1 = {''USB Cleaver APK ''} and p 2 = {''.link/.inf package''}) in the first phase (PH1). The most common infection start point is the smartphone's storage, where the malware is located (e.g., USB Cleaver package p 2 = {''.link/.inf package''}). Once the smartphone is connected to a victim host, the malware is activated and crawls into a host in the second phase (PH2). The malware sends download request package(s) to the infection server (e.g., USB Cleaver instance M (p) = p 1 ||p 2 ||p 3 with package p 3 = {''DLL''}) in the third phase (PH3). The model in Figure 5 (lower part) illustrates one initial infection and two additional packages (PE or Dll files) downloaded from the infection server. Usually, downloaded packages are stored and repacked as a temporary file on a host. Next, the malware starts communicating to the C&C server in the fourth phase (PH4). (PH 1 − 4) consist of finite sets of places P and transitions T as listed in Table 4 .
As illustrated in Figure 5 (lower part), when the malware becomes fully functional in PH4 with complete payloads (e.g., USB Cleaver instance M (p) = p 1 ||p 2 ||p 3 ), it communicates continuously with the C&C server by iterating between Command_n and C&C_n Server (also referred to as live transition instances). In the CPN model of Figure 5 (lower part), Payload_n and Send_n are home markings, which are reachable from all other markings.
C. COMBINED MODEL
Future CP-Mal may include the capability for infected smartphones to further infect other PCs through new USB connections. This scenario is reflected in the Start New Host Infection transition in Figure 5 . In this scenario, the infected app installed on the smartphone VOLUME 5, 2017 Figure 5 . In this scenario, the infected host (e.g., M (p) = p 1 ||p 2 ||p 3 ) includes additional payloads (e.g., M (p||m) = p 1 ||p 2 ||p 3 ||m a ||m b ||m c ) to infect another USB connected smartphone. Figure 5 illustrates the combined model for a cross-platform malware program that can continuously traverse smartphone to/from host USB connections so that it spreads to new hosts. Such malware may move beyond any perimeter protection to reach target computers, even in isolated networks such as control systems. The combined model adds additional phases PH4HtS and PH4StH in parallel to PH4 in Tables 3 and 4. Table 5 lists the places and transitions of these additional phases.
D. CONTINUES INFECTION AND DATA LEAKAGE ANALYSIS IN CPN SCC GRAPH
CPN tools state space report generated 297 nodes and 1161 arcs for USB CP-Mal model as illustrated in Figure 5 . The report illustrates the strongly connected components (SCC) graph to identify Liveness and Fairness of the CP-Mal properties. A Live transition is defined as a live transition t, if starting from any reachable marking, it can always find an occurrence sequence containing t. A fairness property occurs only if infinite firing sequences (IFS) appear in a model. There are four fairness properties can produce by CPN tools:
• Impartial Transition: t occurs infinitely often in every IFS
• Fair Transition: t occurs infinitely often in every IFS where t is enabled infinitely often
• Just Transition: t occurs infinitely often in every IFS where t is continuously enabled from some point onward
• Transition with No Fairness: t is continuously enabled from some point onward and does not fire any more The SCC graph in Figure 6 Start_New_Mobile_Infection and command are transition instances with no fairness. In other words, a live and fairness properties for transactions t in CP-Mal there exists infinite occurrences of sequences of spread infection into susceptible devices and start sending information to the C&C server.
V. CROSS-PLATFORM MALWARE EPIDEMIC MODEL
Having modelled host-to-smartphone and smartphone-tohost infection of a cross-platform malware, malware program in this section, we will now model the spread of crossplatform malware in a large population (e.g., the Internet) of susceptible hosts and smartphones. A malware epidemic can be categorised as self-propagation or human interaction [24] . The mathematical theory of epidemiology is widely used to understand the characteristics of self-propagating malware programs and their behaviour(s) [49] . The common malware epidemic models can be classified into Deterministic, Stochastic and Spatial-Temporal models.
Deterministic Epidemic Models are the most popular malware models because the malware behaves mostly in a deterministic manner [50] . Deterministic models separate the population into three classes. Susceptible (S) individuals are nodes which can be infected by the malware. If a susceptible node is infected by the malware, then it becomes an Infected (I ) node. Infected nodes can infect other susceptible nodes. When a malware program on an infected node is removed, that node is designated as Recovered (R). Depending on the epidemic model, recovered nodes can be susceptible to new infections, or they may be immunized, meaning that they cannot be infected again. There are four deterministic epidemic models used in the literature. In the SI epidemic model (Figure 2a) , susceptible nodes become infected. However, these nodes do not grant immunity to malware. In the SIS epidemic model (Figure 2b ), infected nodes become susceptible immediately after they recover from the infection. In the SIR epidemic model (Figure 2c ), infected nodes develop immunity to the infection following recovering. Finally, in the SIRS epidemic model (Figure 2d ), infected nodes can recover, but the recovered nodes can be susceptible to new infection. VOLUME 5, 2017
A. CROSS-PLATFORM MALWARE (CP-MAL) EPIDEMIC MODEL
There are few epidemic models proposed in the literature. Due to the deterministic nature of general malware spread, the majority of the proposed models are deterministic. Proposed epidemic models only consider malware spread through smartphone-to-smartphone infections using Bluetooth (BT), Wireless LAN (WLAN), SMS and MMS interfaces. As a result, nodes in the susceptible and infected populations are assumed to be smartphones. However, the majority of malware infections today are in the form of app market-to-smartphone infections. Moreover, due to the emergence of CP-Mal as explained in this study, it can be estimated that in the near future, malware will spread through interactions between smartphones (Android, Windows, IOS), hosts (Windows, Linux, Unix, MAC OS), or app markets. Hence, there will be several other forms of infections: (1) app markets to other app markets or smartphones, (2) smartphones to other smartphones or hosts, (3) hosts to other hosts or smartphones.
When a malware is detected and removed from a smartphone (s), a host (h) or an app market (m), antivirus software may provide immunity against the malware. However, malware code may be changed constantly to avoid detection, e.g., through poly-/meta-morphism. Hence, a removed node may become susceptible to the same malware. For this reason, we model CP-Mal spread using the SIRS deterministic model, where (1) S(i, t) is the number of susceptible nodes of type i(i ∈ {s, h, m}) at time t, (2) I (i, t) is the number of infected nodes, (3) R(i, t) is the number of removed nodes, (4) N is the size of population, (5) α(i) is the mean recovery rate, (6) β(i, j) is the infection rate from node of type i to node of type j where i, j ∈ {s, h, } and β(m, h) = β(h, m) = β(s, m) = 0 (7) δ(i) is the average loss of immunity, and (8) λ(i) and µ(i) are death and birth rates, respectively. We assume that death (depreciated nodes) and birth (new nodes) rates are equal. Thus, for i ∈ {s, h, m}, we propose the following SIRS deterministic model in Equation 5.
B. EVALUATION OF CP-MAL SIRS EPIDEMIC MODEL
To verify the validity of the SIRS epidemic model for CP-Mal spread, we developed MATLAB simulation based on our SIRS deterministic model Equation 5 . We considered a population with 4000 hosts and smartphones. We assumed both λ(i) and µ(i) parameters have identical values. The rest of the parameters are initiated as listed in Table 6 by considering malware mutations and app markets for initial distribution.
Studies on polymorphic malware techniques show that even the antivirus products which claim to be resistant to malware mutation provide none or little protection [51] . Infections and spreading in polymorphic mobile malware can be compared to influenza epidemiology infection and spread models. Influenza viruses change periodically (sequential evolution), so the population loses immunity after recovery from infection and become susceptible again. Likewise, CP-Mal which uses mutation techniques can spread among communities that use (non-)homogeneous smartphone operating systems.
A study on smart device battery life indicates that for short charges (30 minutes or less), USB connections are used more. Users charge their smart devices with USB after 137 uses (60% of the time) and using a power outlet after 90 uses (40% of the time) [52] . This study reflects the parameter of contact rate β in SIRS epidemic model.
In addition, in some cases, the malware creates n! new variants, where each new variant has a unique signature for antivirus detection [53] . Thus to evade traditional signature-based detection and generating new malware package, the server-side polymorphism technique is used by the cybercriminal. This malicious method mutates malware every time a malware program is downloaded.
This means smartphones are continuously susceptible for further infection, if and only if the malware authors use polymorphisms techniques; thus, the speed of production of the new poly-/meta-morphism malware has a significant impact on average loss of immunity parameter δ in SIRS epidemic model.
The results from extensive experiment shows that after a smart device has been infected and recovered from the infection, the influence of malware mutation can expose it to infection. Figures 7 and 8 illustrate anti-malware software which are able to control spread infection and kill malware if and only if poly-/meta-morphism techniques are not used. On the other hand, Figures 9 and 10 illustrate that even updated anti-malware is not able to control spreading CP-Mal under a mutation influence factor in our SIRS epidemic model.
FIGURE 7.
The result shows that malware cannot spread and infect other smartphones after a susceptible smartphone gains immunity. This is as a result of the loss of immunity rate δ not being taken into account.
FIGURE 8.
The infection and recovery populations reached their highest level at time ≈ 26. This is because the malware recovery rate α is slightly faster than the loss of immunity rate δ (mutation).
FIGURE 9.
The result shows that the rapid malware mutation δ increased the susceptibility of immune host/smart/mobile devices.
C. OPTIMAL DEFENCE STRATEGY FOR POLY-/META-MORPHISM AND CROSS PLATFORM MALWARE
In [54] , the concept of game theory is used to determine the selective usefulness of the optimal countermeasure parameters to attain a robust defence against the spread of dynamic wireless malware while minimally affecting the normal performance of the network. This study uses underlying zerosum game to identify structural properties of the saddle-point strategies. The zero-sum is a situation in game theory in which one entity's (e.g., Malware, Security countermeasures) gain is equivalent to another's loss, so it is the win-lose situation. For example, an updated anti-malware software will lose the game only if the new malware is created or mutated. A zero-sum game may have as few as two players or as many as millions of participants. In a game, each of n players can choose among a set of strategies S i , i = 1, . . . , n,, and there are functions u i , i = 1, . . . , n : S 1 × . . . × S n → R which assign to each such combined choice for each player. A malware can use the combination of malicious choices (e.g., poly-/meta-morphism and cross-platform techniques) in such way to gain equivalent advantage to the security countermeasures. Likewise, security countermeasures can use several choices (e.g., update malware's signature, distribute security patch or dynamic malware analysis) to neutralize malware threats only if malware is detected.
The game depends on a pay-off matrix which facilitates a set of strategies available to them, which are called rules of the game. The zero-sum game theory for poly-/metamorphism and cross-platform malware cannot precisely represent optimal countermeasure parameters for robust defence strategies. This is because malware use artificial intelligence and become autonomous [55] . In addition, spreading a malware and recovery events are mutually exclusive; therefore, the question is what constitutes rational behaviour in such cases when malware authors are using poly-/meta-morphism and cross-platform techniques?
Nash Equilibrium [56] represent a concept of the game where the optimal outcome of a game is one where no player has an incentive to deviate from chosen strategies after an opponent's choice. We assume that both players know the rules of the game and each player knows that its opponent knows the rules (prisoner's dilemma). Consider a system with two players M (CP-Mal) and R (anti-malware). In SIRS deterministic model with N populations, the matrix of strategies will be as follows: (a) if M use mutation techniques and changes periodically, N loses immunity after recovery from infection and becomes susceptible; (b) if M does not use FIGURE 11. In the case of poly-/meta-morphism and cross platform malware, the globally stable state strategy to control malware spread is to keep influence of the malware mutation δ be identical with recovery rate α. mutation techniques, then R's gain is equivalent to M 's gain, and N can recovery from infection and does not become susceptible once again; (c) if both M and R use mutation and antimutation techniques, respectively, at time t i ∈ T , then N is an stable state (equilibrium point); and (d) if both M and R do not use mutation and anti-mutation techniques, respectively, then N is on unstable states and M can decide to use mutation techniques. Therefore, decision (c) is a globally stable state and decision D is the less optimal state. Figure 11 illustrates the globally optimal stable state in SIRS deterministic model.
Through the derivation and stability analysis of the equilibrium points for the SIRS model, we achieve the thresholds of whether a piece of cross-platform malware spreads or dies out in a smartphone/host population. As malware infection and spread continues, an infected individual has to gain immunity against that malware. The immunity usually will be obtained through updating security patches, creating signatures, and updating anti-malware software. For example, on Friday, 12 May 2017, newly developed viral ransomware, infected more than 250,000 individuals in over 150 countries (i.e., pandemic spread).
To immunize individuals and kill off the ransomware, the signatures and security patch have to be distributed and each individual device updated in the population. As the ransomware continues infecting the individuals, at the same time individuals are gaining immunity. However, if the ransomware uses poly-/meta-morphism techniques, then immunization gained by individuals cannot fortify against the newly developed ransomware variant. This means the ransomware has dynamic behaviour (mutation) and spatial distribution of malware propagation over the time. Consequently, such immunized individuals can be susceptible to the same malware infection again and again. The blue curve presented in Figure 11 shows that individuals are still susceptible to infection, even if dynamic behaviours of the next ransomware variants are efficiently predicted. In Figure 11 predicting dynamic behaviours presents at point (X : 35.72, Y : 1766S), where the immunization and infection are continuous coincident over a time. At this point, an outbreak of a pandemic malware comes under control but does not die out entirely.
VI. CONCLUDING DISCUSSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
In this paper we developed micro (infection) and macro (spread) models by reverse engineering, analysing, visualizing and formalizing the existing malware. We analysed and simulated models to identify and assess the important parameters that may affect the scale of major infections among smartphone users. The micro (infection) model analysis clearly shows that the USB activation method is an important parameter for the initial infection. USB connection, as the contact rate (β) in CP-Mal SIRS epidemic model, may cause high infection rates among the population of smart devices. In other words, the higher the value of β, the greater rate of infection. On the other hand, a macro (spread) model analysis shows that a malware program's mutation ability (δ) is an extremely important parameter for CP-Mal spread, where the mutation parameter δ represents a poly-/metamorphism technique used in malware to evade the signaturebased detection software.
Based on the simulation and key parameter analysis in CP-Mal and the SIRS mathematical model, we arrive at the following prevention recommendations to control the spread of a CP-Mal that use poly-/meta-morphism effectively. First, the intensive use of USB connections causes faster malware spread and infections among the digitized population; however we are aware that strategies such as permanently abandoning USB technology are not possible. Hence, one solution is to create USB Pass-through security mechanism, which may effectively prevent initial infection. A USB passthrough allows smartphone users to use USB connection within a buffer-zone in a sandbox environment. In passthrough solution, USB connection of the smartphone redirects data through a buffer zone and inspects file signatures' headers for unwanted data transfer in either direction between the PC and the smartphone.
Considering the mobile user behaviour in spread malware, the coefficient of contact rate (β) has to be controlled in the case of CP-Mal spread. USB authentication, authorization, and accountability can be an alternative approach for effectively reducing the contact rate β for initiating malware infection through accidental connection. Together with a USB authentication mechanism, it may help increase user awareness and motivate users to be a trusted part of the security processes.
The third solution strategy to control CP-Mal spread is to keep the influence of the malware mutation δ identical with the recovery rate α. This provides stability of the free CP-Mal equilibrium. As shown in Figure 11 , both infection and recovery parameters are coincident with the ideal security countermeasure. This can be achieved through determining the threat's next action based on fuzzy hashing techniques [57] to predict the next signature of the mutated malware. Since the homologous malware files share identical sets of bits in the same order, there is a high possibility to identify and create a next signature for a poly-/meta-morphism malware.
